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9/11 forever changed the world, the United States of America, and certainly New
York City. The events of that day also had a profound and long-term impact on the
operations of the New York City Law Department, the matters it handles, and the law
applicable to its clients. 9/11 was also a defining event in my own professional life.
Most of us remember where we were on that fateful morning. I was working in
private practice and having breakfast on the top floor of Rockefeller Center. I was
looking south, directly at the World Trade Center, when I suddenly saw smoke
coming out of the building. Little did I suspect that the cause of this smoke would
change my life forever. To oversimplify: it did.
There are many who say that but for 9/11 and New Yorkers’ recognition that a
nonpolitical businessman was needed to lead the city in 9/11’s aftermath, Michael
Bloomberg would never have been elected mayor. And of course, if he had not been
elected he could not have appointed me Corporation Counsel.
After 9/11, I was frustrated by my inability to help, despite all the many needs
that were apparent. I was not a firefighter, nor a police officer, nor a rescue worker. I
was not even a bar leader who might have taken the initiative to organize pro bono
legal help for 9/11 victims. So when Mayor-elect Bloomberg offered me the
opportunity to serve as Corporation Counsel, I jumped at the chance. Although I
had never met him before he interviewed me for the job, I thought that I could help
the city I love. I have never regretted my decision. Not only does the job give me the
opportunity to help New York City every single day, but the operational and
substantive legal challenges emanating from 9/11 have been immense.
Although I was not Corporation Counsel on 9/11, it is important to understand
what happened at the New York City Law Department in the days and weeks
following that dreadful day. Since the Law Department is located directly across the
street from Ground Zero, the office obviously had to be evacuated; indeed, debris
from the collapse of the towers reached the sixth floor offices of the Department.
All of our computers were destroyed. For the next seven months, the Department’s
lawyers and staff were located in forty-four separate offices throughout New York
City, primarily in space generously donated by law firms as well as in space abandoned
by other city agencies. The logistical challenges posed by such an arrangement were
immense. For example, for the first three or four months after 9/11, our lawyers had
to cross a National Guard roadblock in order to retrieve their case files.
Yet the legal work of New York City had to continue. Only hours after the planes
hit, lawyers from the Department, who had no access to records or form files, sat at
New York City’s Pier 94 in front of borrowed laptops drafting emergency statutes as
well as the executive orders and related documents then Mayor Rudy Giuliani issued
in the tragedy’s immediate aftermath. Others spent the initial weeks after 9/11 at the
pier helping the families of the victims obtain death certificates and related
documents. It was a very grim job, but the lawyers reported feeling tremendous
satisfaction in helping others. As one lawyer in my office said, “This was why I
became a lawyer.” Numerous volunteer lawyers joined in this effort, leading then
Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals to call the profession’s
response to the tragedy “the bar’s finest hour.”
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Although the Law Department moved back to its headquarters in April of 2002,
some of the psychological scars from 9/11 remain today. Every day, when Law
Department attorneys look out their windows, they see both the rebirth of the
Ground Zero area and a reminder of what was there before 9/11. People who were in
the building when the planes hit across the street may have outwardly recovered. But
I have no doubt that painful memories remain for many, perhaps forever changing
how they view the world.
We naturally focus on the human impact of the disaster, but the effects of 9/11
go beyond that; the operational challenges of running a government law office were
forever altered by the events of that day. Security passes to enter buildings, disaster
plans, continuity of operations contingencies, emergency website addresses, full
building evacuation drills, and notebooks and CDs containing draft executive orders
for every eventuality are the norm for Law Department attorneys today—and, I have
no doubt, for virtually every government law office in New York City.
The impacts of 9/11 described above are undoubtedly well known. However, the
long-term effects of 9/11 on the law—and, in particular, on the legal matters the
Law Department handles—may not be readily apparent, are still evolving, and are in
many ways among the most interesting effects to ref lect upon. At the Law
Department, 9/11 has had a major influence on at least three substantive aspects of
our practice: the rebuilding of Ground Zero, the lawsuits resulting from 9/11, and
the law’s accommodation of our constitutional rights with the government’s need to
guard against terrorism.
The most immediate need was to rebuild the area where the World Trade Center
towers once stood. In redesigning the site, the planners faced the choice of rebuilding
to the prior level of development or leaving the site as a memorial and a park. Many
who argued for the latter were not only the families of 9/11 victims, who wanted the
site to be sacrosanct, but also those who believed the site could never be adequately
protected as long as a terrorist threat existed. But to take that approach would have
been to anticipatorily surrender. The compromise was to achieve a design plan that
shifted development away from the footprints of the towers and to provide for
numerous security arrangements, such as an on-site vehicle security center and a
manpower allocation between the New York Police Department and the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey.
The legal problems with which the Law Department had to deal in connection
with the rebuilding could fill a textbook on corporate and real estate law. They
included reaching agreements over the parameters for the actual redesign of the site
among the numerous local, state, federal, and private stakeholders at Ground Zero;
structuring the reinstatement of part of the street grid at the site (which had been
eliminated when the World Trade Center was built in the 1960s); providing legal
support for the construction financing; addressing street closures and other practical
issues that arose during construction; and reaching agreement on the payment of real
property taxes, which involved settling several lawsuits the city had brought against
the Port Authority for such taxes.
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A very different set of issues that have occupied an enormous amount of the Law
Department’s time concerns compensation for individuals who claim to have suffered
injury as a result of 9/11 and its aftermath. Since Osama bin Laden and the other
terrorists responsible for the attack were not going to pay their victims, who would
compensate the families of the nearly 3000 people who were killed or the thousands
of people who became ill during the months that followed? Initially, Law Department
lawyers worked with congressional representatives to make the regulations of the
federal no-fault September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 as broad and
efficient as possible. Until it closed in 2004, the Fund, which was extraordinarily
well-administered by Special Master Kenneth Feinberg, provided approximately $7
billion in compensation to the families of those killed and to many of the people
injured on 9/11 and in its immediate aftermath.
The Law Department also worked to protect the city from the excessive costs of
the litigation that would inevitably f low from 9/11. With the help of numerous
others, Law Department lawyers were able to persuade the government to amend
existing federal legislation to add a $350 million cap on city liability relating to 9/11
and its aftermath. We also crafted a completely new kind of insurance entity—a citycreated “captive” insurance company—to provide additional insurance since the
insurance covering the city and its contractors was clearly insufficient. Working with
others, we helped convince the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
to fund this new kind of insurance, and we worked with Congress and the New York
State legislature to pass legislation to permit the captive insurance company to
become a reality. As a result, more than $1 billion in federal funds was made available
to insure the city and its contractors and, assuming liability might be shown, to
compensate Ground Zero workers and others who became ill following the attack.
This insurance proved to be very important. In the years after it was obtained,
more than 10,000 separate suits were brought against the city and its contractors by
individuals claiming to have become ill as a result of their work during the rescue,
recovery, or debris-removal operations at Ground Zero.1 Since the Victims
Compensation Fund had already closed at the time the later suits were brought,
however, these more than 10,000 potential claimants had no alternative but to sue.
The litigation—which would have required each plaintiff to prove both that the city
and/or the contractors were negligent and that the plaintiff ’s illness resulted from
working at Ground Zero—was protracted, contentious, and expensive. Hundreds of
depositions were taken and millions of paper and electronic documents were
produced. Injured plaintiffs received nothing while this massive discovery effort was
conducted and important issues were appealed twice to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.2 The city found itself in the unwanted position of opposing
many of the heroes who responded so bravely to the terrorist attack. And the litigation
1.

Another 1000 suits in addition to the original 10,000 were filed by people who worked to clean
buildings near ground zero. Unlike the other 10,000 suits, these were not settled.

2.

See McCue v. City of New York (In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.), 521 F.3d 169 (2d Cir.
2008); McNally v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. (In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.), 414 F.3d 352
(2d Cir. 2005).
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cost many millions of dollars that might have been better spent caring for those who
became ill.
In December of 2010, the city settled one of the largest mass tort litigations in
this country’s history when more than ninety-five percent of the plaintiffs agreed to
accept a total payout of more than $625 million. The settlement means that the
plaintiffs receive compensation and, at the same time, the city’s captive insurance
company has more than $400 million left to defend the city in the unsettled cases
and the many more suits that are likely still to come. During settlement negotiations,
the city and others continued to advocate for a reopening of the Victim Compensation
Fund. Those efforts bore fruit with the passage of the James Zadroga 9/11 Health
and Compensation Act, 3 which, in addition to reopening the Victim Compensation
Fund to cover claims not covered by the just-settled litigation, provided a stable
source of long-term funding for medical services for people affected by the attack.
The Law Department’s experience with the 9/11 claims—the success of the
Victim Compensation Fund and the problems encountered litigating other claims—
leads me to ask a fundamental question: Are mass tort actions the way to compensate
either the victims of a terrorist attack or the people who become ill as a result of
recovery efforts? Cases like these engender huge legal and administrative fees, take
years to resolve, and require those injured to prove their injuries resulted from fault
by the defendant. Think about it. Eight years of litigation, literally hundreds of
millions of dollars of legal fees, and the government being forced to litigate against
its citizens who were real heroes in the city’s time of need. At the same time, the very
prospect of being sued could deter private companies from playing their essential role
in disaster recovery. Concretely, will the experience of the 9/11 contractors being
named in thousands of post-9/11 lawsuits discourage private companies from helping
the city, or any government, the next time (and we all recognize there may well be a
next time) America suffers an attack of this magnitude?
I suggest that the way to avoid this litigation quagmire in the future is for
Congress to enact legislation now that creates an administrative mechanism for
compensating the people who suffer as a result of a major disaster like 9/11. Federal
legislation could be modeled on the no-fault 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund and
written to compensate people who become ill as a result of vital disaster recovery
work as well as the immediate impact of the disaster. While others involved in the
9/11 litigation disagree with this approach,4 and while there may be many other
solutions, one thing is clear: this is an issue to be confronted now rather than after
the next disaster, when people will be suffering and response efforts may be hobbled
by litigation fears.
One dominant post-9/11 legal issue remains to be discussed: our freedoms. How
can we honor our treasured constitutional rights, particularly those under the First
3.

See James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-347, 124 Stat. 3623
(2011) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).

4.

See, e.g., Kenneth R. Feinberg, What is Life Worth? The Unprecedented Effort to Compensate
the Victims of 9/11 (2005); Kenneth R. Feinberg, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001:
Policy and Precedent, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1115 (2011–12).
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and Fourth Amendments, when at the same time we need to protect ourselves against
terrorism? This has been an issue with which our country, and in fact the entire
world, has struggled since the attacks of 9/11. No easy answer exists, and this issue is
likely to be debated well into the next century, if not beyond. However, a number of
cases litigated by the Law Department that raised these issues have highlighted that
courts, while being very careful to protect our liberties, recognize that the balance
they must strike in such situations has changed.
The first case to pose this issue for the Law Department was Handschu v. Special
Services Division, in which the city successfully moved to modify a consent decree
that had placed limitations upon the New York City Police Department’s ability to
collect and utilize intelligence information.5 The main limitation in the then-existing
consent decree was the requirement that, before the NYPD could conduct
investigations of “political activity” (defined as “the exercise of a right of expression
or association for the purpose of maintaining or changing governmental policies or
social conditions”),6 it needed a reason to believe that criminal activity had occurred,
was occurring, or was about to occur. Unfortunately, this limitation created a loophole
for terrorists: investigations of preparatory activities to an attack such as 9/11 were
prohibited by the decree, thereby precluding investigation at an early stage.
Accepting that fact, the court in Handschu modified the consent decree to provide
the NYPD with greater flexibility to collect information and to investigate political
activity. While “[t]he Constitution’s protections are unchanging,” Judge Haight
wrote, “the nature of public peril can change with dramatic speed, as recent events
show.”7 The court, however, was “mindful of the crucial importance of preserving
both individual freedoms and public safety, and balancing the legitimate demands of
those two goals.”8
Handschu is by no means the only post-9/11 case in which courts have had to
strike a balance between individuals’ freedoms and public safety. In United for Peace
and Justice v. City of New York, an anti-war group sought an injunction that would
require the city to issue a permit for a protest march past the United Nations
headquarters, despite a post-9/11 ban on all marches past the building.9 Citing
security and logistical concerns, the NYPD was willing to permit only a stationary
rally near the U.N.10 Weighing the need to protect the public against the protesters’
interest in expressing themselves, the district court and the Second Circuit agreed
with the city that, under the circumstances, a stationary rally constituted a reasonable
time, place, and manner restriction under the First Amendment.11
5.

273 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

6.

Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384, 1420 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

7.

Handschu, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 348.

8.

Id. at 349.

9.

243 F. Supp. 2d 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff ’d 323 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2003).

10.

Id. at 25.

11.

Id. at 25, 30–31.
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A few years later, Law Department attorneys once again found themselves
defending the city’s actions against claims that it had gone too far in restricting
individual freedoms in the name of safety. In the summer of 2005, after terrorists
bombed public transportation systems in London, Moscow, and Madrid, the NYPD
instituted a random bag search program on the New York City subway system. The
New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) sued, claiming that the searches were
unlikely to deter terrorists and too invasive to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
Presented with expert evidence that random bag searches had significant deterrence
value, the district court rejected the NYCLU’s argument.12 Unanimously affirming,
the Second Circuit held that the bag search program “satisfies the special needs
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s usual requirement of individualized
suspicion.”13
The courts faced a similar need to balance public safety and civil rights in two
decisions arising out of the ongoing litigation involving the 2004 Republican
National Convention (RNC) held in New York City. In the first, a precedential
decision on the law enforcement privilege, the Second Circuit found the public’s
interest in the non-disclosure of confidential police department intelligence
documents outweighed the plaintiffs’ need for the information.14 In another decision,
the district court found that the city’s time, place, and manner restriction on protests
near the main site of the RNC was narrowly tailored “because of the unique policing
challenges posed by the RNC venue and the customized nature of the corresponding
security measures.”15 The RNC litigation will undoubtedly generate additional
decisions addressing these competing interests.
The events of 9/11 forever changed this country and this city. The lives lost, the
physical and emotional damage done, and the hopes and dreams that died that day
are losses from which we will never fully recover. 9/11 was a day on which we all lost
a feeling of security, a sense of innocence. Children today grow up in a very different
world than children at their age ten years ago; they do not have the luxury of
considering an emergency response drill as an annoyance, as something that they will
certainly never need. This new awareness of the dangers all Americans face simply by
living in a place of our choosing influences the debate about the balance of our
freedoms against the need to increase public safety measures. In this new, changed
world there are those who believe that the only way to win the War on Terror is by
protecting the very freedoms the terrorists are attacking, and there are others who
believe that the safety of our people is most important—that freedoms will mean little
in a society where people constantly fear for the lives of their loved ones.

12.

MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05 Civ. 6921, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39695, at *69 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005),
aff ’d 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006).

13.

MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 2010).

14.

In re City of New York, 607 F.3d 923 (2d Cir. 2010).

15.

Marcavage v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 4949, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107724, at *19–20 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 29, 2010).
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Governments, and certainly government lawyers, must somehow seek to strike a
balance that is as elusive as it is vital. The only thing we really do know is that we
will continue to struggle to find the best answer, one that represents the views and
interests of New Yorkers and one that reminds us and all of the world why this
country, and this city, are seen as symbols of progress and civilization.
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